 Investment banks have strong capital adequacy, in particular with respect to their hedge credit fund exposures -some estimates of which are provided below.
 Ironically, the fastest growing area of new financial products that utilise highly-complex derivative products exclusively lies mostly within the regulated sector. This is the market for "structured products" that are produced by investment banks and sold to retail, private bank and institutional clients. The strong volume growth in this area, particularly in Europe and Australasia, creates ex-ante derivative pricing pressure, and hedge funds frequently take the other side of the trades (reducing ex-post volatility).
 The size of this market is very roughly estimated to be around USD 3.8 trillion, already over half of the notional size of the hedge fund industry (AUM plus leverage), and growing quickly in the last two years.
 Structured products are passive in nature (unlike hedge fund active styles), and focus on providing returns (for different risk profiles of clients) with some element of capital guarantee. Constant proportion portfolio insurance (CPPI) is one of the popular newgeneration techniques. These products have not been tested when major anomalies in volatility arise. They are highly exposed to downward price gaps in the "risky" assets used in their construction.
 The potential for a crisis scenario in the event of such anomalies in volatility, with multiple investment banks having to close positions (due to "knock-on" effects) is considered. Hedge fund and other counterparty"s ability to meet calls in this situation would affect the size of the balance sheet risk for investment banks.
 This raises two main policy issues.
(1) The balance sheet risks to investment banks offering guaranteed products: stress testing for worst case scenarios and ensuring capital adequacy for them is important to reduce concerns about financial stability; and (2) given the large retail market segment, consumer education and protection.
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I. What is a hedge fund?
Hedge Funds have grown quickly over the past ten years, and are important part of the financial landscape. They are difficult to define as entities, because the line between what hedge funds do that other institutions do not is blurredproprietary traders in investment banks, private equity funds, and fund managers all use extensive leverage and derivatives to trade markets or to shift risks.
Lightly-regulated active investment style using derivatives
The definition of a hedge fund used here is as follows: lightly-regulated managers of private capital that use an active investment approach to play arbitrage opportunities that arise when mis-pricing of financial instruments emerge. Extensive use of leverage and derivatives is a common feature of hedge funds.
The main differences between a hedge fund and a private equity fund are: (a) the private equity fund looks to use leverage to buy companies to obtain full management control for purposes of changing its structure operations, whereas a hedge fund trades assets without looking for full control; (b) the hedge fund covers a multitude of styles, only one small part of which might involve buying shares to force management to make value enhancing changes (activist); and (c) hedge funds often (but not always) have a shorter investment horizon than private equity firms.
They play a key role in providing liquidity
Overall, hedge funds fill a broad role in providing liquidity in markets where pricing anomalies have occurred, often due to lack of breadth. In the main this is a volatility reducing activity that is an essential part of the efficient working of financial markets and financial stability.
II. Hedge fund industry size: AUM versus turnover
Size of USD 1.4 trillion AUM At the start of 2007, estimates suggest that hedge funds have over USD 1.4 trillion assets under management (considerably less than the USD 18 trillion in mutual funds; see Table 1 ). Some high-end estimates have it higher at closer to USD 2 trillion. The bulk of hedge fund activity is in the United States, followed by the United Kingdom and EU (ex UK), with Australasia next. 
Augmented by leverage
Of course the "fire-power" of hedge funds is greatly augmented beyond this by leverage, though the amount of this is uncertain due to lack of reporting and the difficulty of assessing the implicit gearing of derivatives. 
And have a large impact on market turnover
Leverage, when combined with a rapid and focused trading style, allows hedge funds to have a much bigger impact on market turnover than the AUM figures would suggest. In Table 2 data from Greenwich Associates suggests that hedge funds account for between 30% and 60% of market turnover, depending on the financial instrument concerned. This of course is very large indeed, and illustrates why understanding financial market behaviour today without ISSN 0378-651X © OECD 2007 including explicit analysis of hedge funds is quite impossible.
Two concerns often raised with respect to hedge funds are: (a) that they create volatility in markets due to their large role in turnover, and (b) that the leverage they undertake may raise financial stability issues, where defaults with counterparties occur -an issue given some credence by the late 1990s failure of LTCM, that required a major private bank-led work out to resolve.
III.
Hedge funds reduce volatility
Volatility-reducing role
The analysis in this paper suggests that hedge funds play a very positive role in financial markets by providing liquidity to thin markets where mis-priced financial instruments are to be found. This type of activity reduces volatility rather than increasing it.
Particularly given the growth of structured products
Indeed with the rapid growth of structured products in recent years, particularly in Europe and Asia, hedge funds have been quite critical in containing the volatility that might otherwise have arisen. Structured products are largely driven by investment banks, and have resulted in the proliferation of new and highly-complex derivative products (discussed below). Figure 1 shows the VIX index of market volatility, the junk bond versus AAA spread and the TED spread (the offshore Eurodollar 3-month rate versus the 3-month Treasury). Volatility has fallen, and spreads have narrowed.
Hedge funds are put sellers in the carry trade
In large part, spread narrowing in the past few years has been a process that has been driven by hedge fund or "carry" trades. These carry trades are usually implemented with derivatives. A spread emerges where risk premia in two financial instruments differ. These are taken advantage of by selling puts. These pay the seller a premium in income (positive "carry") and work as long as the spreads do not blow out as a consequence of some credit event. The buyers of puts (the other side of the trade), have negative carry (they pay a premium to the seller) and so continually lose money as markets rally and spreads narrow. Buyers rely for profit on an ISSN 0378-651X © OECD 2007 adverse credit event to occur to put them "in the money". The longer this does not happen the greater is the incentive of buyers of puts to stop further losses by quitting the trade. As this occurs the spreads have to narrow further (because buyers of puts need to be induced by further price action). In the absence of exogenous risk events, volatility continues to fall and spreads narrow. 
Structured products are natural buyers of puts

IV.
Hedge fund performance, fees and costs Table 3 shows hedge fund composite performance reported in Thomson Financial Datastream versus the MSCI global equity index. These returns are net of MERs (management expense ratios, arising from trading), incurred as costs to make the returns, and fund manager costs.
Hedge fund performance has been declining
Three things stand out: (1) hedge funds have managed to outperform the global index on average, but not every year; (2) hedge fund performance is correlated with global performance, but does much better relatively when equity markets are weak or falling (good diversifying characteristics); (3) both total and relative performance have declined in the 2000"s. 
Hedge funds have to spend a lot to make a lot
Hedge funds" massive share of turnover means that they pay a lot to investment banks for their activities (execution costs), and the funds have to pay their fund managers very well. MERs are very high for hedge funds, compared to mutual funds (due to turnover). Broking estimates suggest ISSN 0378-651X © OECD 2007 that about 25% of the pre-MER-traded returns are absorbed by fees paid to hedge fund managers, and around 20% are absorbed by execution costs to prime broker dealers, i.e. about 45% in all. So for the 11.3% return in 2006, hedge funds would have earned 11.3/(1-0.45)=20.5% before MERs.
Which pushes towards more leverage
The point here is that to generate double digit returns to investors, hedge funds would have to try to earn raw pre-MER returns of 20% or so, and this further pushes pressure towards more leverage (to gear up the return from investing in low risk and return spread trades).
V. Hedge fund styles
Long-short styles dominate
A summary of the different styles of hedge funds and the proportion of the market they occupy is shown in Table  4 , based on Hedge Fund Industry Research data. An indication of the broad activity involved in the style is shown on the right hand side. Most of these strategies are long-short in nature: all of the equity hedge (e.g. long a stock and long a put to hedge its fall); most of event driven (e.g. buy the target M&A company and sell the buyer); all of relative value arbitrage (e.g. buy the London listing and sell the Sydney listing if an arbitrage spread premium opens); and all of sector, convertible arbitrage and equity market neutral. The macro (e.g. long only) and other (e.g. corporate governance activist, structured products, etc.) categories include directional riskier plays.
Low-risk spread trades require leverage to make returns
The dominant nature of this long-short or spread trading activity explains why hedge funds do so well in market downturns (i.e. it is not directional). But it also explains why leverage needs to be relatively high: investing in a strong stock market generates strong returns, while investing in a low-risk spread in a long-short strategy does not. So the trade has to be levered up a number of times in order for the spread trades to generate competitive returns (while keeping the benefit of avoiding directional risk in the market).
This understanding of how the various styles work, together with the return and MER cost information, can be used to get some idea of overall hedge fund leverage. 
VI. Implied hedge fund leverage
Data on hedge fund leverage is difficult to find, and more work needs to be done in this area
It is difficult to find data on hedge fund leverage, and more work needs to be done in this area. Illustrative calculations based on the nature of returns and the type of hedge fund activity can be used to infer some idea of the amount of leverage involved. These calculations show that hedge funds are likely to be somewhat less levered than banks and broker-dealers. This is as it should be, since banks come within the purview of regulation and supervision, and benefit from lender-of-last-resort facilities -they can take on more risk.
A simple calculation to imply leverage
The calculation is shown in here we assume a 1% return (somewhere between the very low TED spread of around 0.5 ppt and the high 2 ppt spread on junk bonds versus AAA shown in Figure ) ; (b) medium returns for equity type spreads of about 4%, reflecting the average equity risk premium, with about USD 919 billion in AUM; and (c) high returns for outright equity type long positions, with about USD 415 billion AUM -the 20% return for this grouping shown in the table is roughly equal to the MSCI return for 2006 shown in Table 3 .
The implied leverage then is simple enough to calculate. Fixed income arbitrage managers would need to have geared their portfolios 19 times to generate the 20% pre-MER return earned in 2006 (in order to give the observed 11% to investors). This implies gearing of USD 1 835 billion, in addition to the USD 97 billion in AUM. Other long-short styles would have had to gear only 4 times to generate 20%, implying USD 3 676 billion in gearing. Finally, the long only funds would not have had to gear at all to generate the 20% return in 2006. Source: OECD.
USD 5.5 trillion hedge fund leverage number
Together these 3 groupings imply an overall leverage ratio of only 3.9 times, or a total leverage of USD 5.5 trillion compared to the USD 1.3 trillion of funds under management. The bulk of this USD 5.5 trillion will come through implicit leverage in derivatives (see below).
VII.
Counterparty risk with prime brokers Table 6 uses publicly available information on prime broker counterparty exposures, using (published) company report balance sheet data. The 10 largest prime brokers in the area of counterparty risk were chosen, and these cover, on our best estimate, about 80% of the total. Margin lending is not broken out of other credit activities in the publicly available reports. Counterparties are typically other banks and hedge funds. There are four key areas where prime brokers generate credit exposure in their financing relationships (counterparty risk). These are:
Sources of credit exposure in counterparty risk 1. Securities lending: the bank lends securities to hedge funds and others, and gets cash or other securities as collateral (found on the liabilities side of the balance sheet as cash received as collateral for securities lent). Hedge funds, for example, borrow stock in order to short securities. Other banks also borrow stock.
Reverse repurchase agreements: the bank buys
securities from a hedge fund etc. which in turn commits to buy them back (found on the asset side of the balance sheet) -the hedge fund gets a credit, ISSN 0378-651X © OECD 2007 but counterparty risk arises in the event that the customer cannot fulfil its obligations. This is an important mechanism of hedge fund borrowing.
3. Derivatives: derivative contracts with hedge funds create counterparty risk (found on the asset side of the balance sheet), which is measured as their positive replacement value (PRV). This is equal to the cost to the bank of replacing all the transactions with a fair value in the bank"s favour, if all the relevant counterparties of the group were to default at the same time. This is a margin account concept, and massively understates the notional value of derivatives contracts (potential command over securities).
4. Margin loans: the bank advances a loan to a hedge fund (asset side) and gets a security from the hedge fund as collateral (usually cash and securities). As mentioned above, this important activity is not separately disclosed by prime brokers. However, we have total margin lending by members of the NYSE, which is shown in the table.
The bottom line of the table grosses up the numbers for industry totals, by assuming that 80% is covered by the top 10 firms. For the margin lending we assume 75% is covered by member of the NYSE.
But capital adequacy is very high in general
The main point to note is that counterparty exposure differs considerably between the prime brokers, with higher risk-taking firms (to generate higher returns) showing high exposures relative to tier 1 capital, and more conservative firms showing much lower ratios. The total exposure of the top 10 firms is about USD 2.9 trillion, and total Tier 1 capital is around USD 408 billion. The capital adequacy ratio vis-a-vis these activities is about 14%, which is very high. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that there are offsetting collateral and risk measures taken throughout the market, and some of the measures like PRV of derivatives is the amount that would apply if 100% of the counterparties were to default. In other words, the call on capital is likely to be low overall.
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This does not mean, however, that major stability issues cannot arise in the case of concentrations of risk for particular firms.
Exposure of prime brokers to the hedge funds group
One prime broker amongst the top 10 firms separates out its exposures between bank and hedge fund counterparties, for 3 of the 4 categories above (excluding margin loans). We have used this as a guide, together with broad discussions with other market participants, to come up with shares for each of the 4 activities as they pertain to hedge funds, shown in Table 7 . Notice that these numbers are also broadly in line with the Greenwich percentage numbers on share of hedge funds in market turnover (see Table 2 ).
And particularly so with respect to hedge funds
Overall, the prime brokers are very well capitalised against hedge fund exposures. The exposure of prime brokers to hedge funds, as a ratio to Tier 1 capital, is 2.4. This is equivalent to a capital adequacy of around 42% versus the hedge fund sector. The overall credit exposure of prime brokers with respect to hedge funds is estimated to be around USD 1.2 trillion. This number is not far off the AUM of the hedge fund industry that we discussed earlier -possibly reflecting the fact that most hedge fund trades are carried out with derivatives, and other activities that require cash margin deposits or collateral to be posted. It is these sorts of deposits that are picked up in the prime broker accounts. ISSN 0378-651X © OECD 2007 Derivatives are the biggest source of leverage for hedge funds
The command over notional assets, however, is much stronger than reflected here. The implicit leverage in derivatives is very large. If we took out USD 5.5 trillion calculation for total leverage, and treated loaned securities, reverse repos and margin loans as fully collateralised, then derivatives PRV of USD 292 billion would, as an example, reflect an implicit derivatives leverage of USD 4.6 trillion (= USD 5.5 trillion -USD 0.9 trillion other debt).
1 So derivatives are easily the biggest source of leverage for hedge funds.
VIII.
What is a structured product?
Structured products are not discretionary
The term "structured product" is the name given to an investment product that provides a return that is predetermined with reference to the performance of one or more underlying markets. The performance of a structured product is therefore based only on the performance of this underlying product and not on the discretion of the product provider. Most often the product relies on the use of derivatives to generate the return, and contains downside protection or guarantees of some form via options.
Structured products are therefore passive in nature, with the cost depending on option and other derivative premia. This contrasts with hedge funds, where the fees are justified on the basis of buying the manager"s active skills.
Structured products may be of the growth variety, offering equity-like returns, but typically including varying elements of capital protection. They also include structured notes, which replicate fixed income products. CDOs (Collateralised Debt Obligations) and CLOs (Collateralised Loan Obligations) would fit into this category of description if they came with derivative transformations. This would imply an average margin of about 6% (= 292/4600 %). If anything this is on the large side for margins, suggesting even higher leverage. But different deals have quite a wide range of margin requirements, and this average number is not wildly out of line. 2.
Some of the income products provide a high income component, but with a risk to the capital return if markets fall (e.g. an equity underlying security with a sold call to ISSN 0378-651X © OECD 2007
Tranche and continuous product varieties
The products are sold in two broad forms: (1) the "tranche" variety, i.e. with a fixed maturity date (typically 1-5 years), or (2) as "continuous" product with no fixed maturity date. They may be closed-end funds, or the seller may be able to cancel shares on redemptions like a mutual fund.
Complex derivative structures are used
While structured products have been around for a long time in various forms, the new-generation portfolios sold use highly complex derivative structures. They use synthetic options replication techniques to tailor products to all combinations of risk and return for investors.
Use of complex derivatives
Constant proportion portfolio insurance
The most popular products use Constant Proportion Portfolio Insurance (CPPI). This is the name given to a trading program that is designed to ensure that a fixed minimum return is achieved either at all times or, more typically, at a set date in the future. Essentially the strategy involves continuously re-balancing the portfolio of investments during the term of the product between socalled risky assets (usually shares) and non-risky assets (usually bonds or cash). As the value of the risky assets rise, more of the portfolio is placed in these assets; but conversely, as they fall in value, more of the portfolio is placed in the non-risky assets. By following the rules set out by the strategy the minimum return can be achieved as long as the value of the risky assets does not fall too sharply. In this case, however, the product provider offering such a product would rely on a guarantee or option provided by a third-party investment bank to ensure that the minimum return was achieved -this is the capital guarantee aspect of the product, wherein lies most of the cost in buying them.
Sold to retail private banking and institutional clients
Because structured products emphasise downside protection with simultaneous participation in the upside, they are very attractive to retail investors. They are sold by investment banks to their retail broking arms. However, they are also sold to private banking clients and to institutions (fund managers, hedge funds, etc).
boost income -so that some of these products can participate in a falling market to some degree). ISSN 0378-651X © OECD 2007 These CPPI products are difficult to understand for technical analysts, so there can be no doubt that the retail buyers of these products will not understand what they are buying. They are often sold with promises of best ex-post returns from a basket of securities, with downside protection -sometimes very much like betting on the winner of a horse race after the race is run. For the 1-1.5% spread cost to the client, such outcomes are deliverable, provided volatility remains normal.
Policy issues
The policy issues that arise here are:
Consumer protection issues arise 1. Financial education and consumer protection, given the complexity of the products; and
Capital adequacy is critical
2. The extent to which financial institution capital standing behind these products (as an ultimate guarantee) might be at risk, if volatility moves into abnormal patterns.
IX. Structured products: the new growth area
Structured products are very popular in Europe and in Australasia, and are becoming more popular in the USA. Figure 2 shows that structured products are one of the fastest growing areas within the financial services sector. In 2002 about USD 65 billion of these products were being issued to retail clients in Europe, whereas by 2006 this had grown to over USD 180 billion of new issues per annum. In 2002 about USD 20 billion was issued to retail clients in Asia, whereas by 2006 the volume was closer to USD 100 billion. These sales considerably understate the flows into the market, because the industry provider of the retail data only has coverage from clients that subscribe to the service. Furthermore, there are no data on the sales to private bank clients (very wealthy individuals with large minimum size investments), nor to the institutional market. The outstanding size of live global structured products could be around USD 3.8 trillion
Structured products sales have been booming in recent years, particularly in Europe and Asia
The approximate size of the outstanding AUM on the retail side of the market is about USD 1.2 trillion. But the private banking and institutional parts of this market are also very large. Industry intelligence suggests that both of these other areas are similar in size to the retail market for structured products. If this is broadly correct, it would put the size of the structured product market at about USD 3.8 trillion (see Table 8 ). This (very approximate) size of the total structured products market is just over half the estimated size of the hedge fund notional size (allowing for leverage) of about USD 6.9 trillion. 
X.
Structured products and hedge funds in a "gap" scenario
The volume of issuance (sales) and the size of outstanding structured product portfolios have a material impact on derivative pricing and spreads. An investment bank will issue derivatives into the market to construct portfolios for sellers of these products, creating natural opportunities for hedge funds to come in on the other side of the trade. It is common knowledge in investment banks that hedge funds help to reduce their volatility risk, providing liquidity in a very complementary way.
Falling volatility and spreads as the volume of product grows requires normal volatility
For example, active hedge fund spread trades alluded to earlier are carried out by selling puts -while portfolio insurance by buying puts is a very important part of providing downside protection to risky assets within a CPPI product. All of this volatility reducing and spread narrowing activity assumes markets continue to perform in the manner that they have in the past few years.
The risk is a major exogenous event that reverses the virtuous circle
The main risk is that a major (exogenous) volatility event occurs. A sharp rise in volatility (known as a "gap" event) poses a risk to the virtuous circle situation described earlier. It is by no means clear that the CPPI and related products could cope with such a gap event, and positions would have to be closed. The size of the potential stability issue that could emerge would depend on:
1. the size of the fall in the market -a move of 20-25% -would be a major test; 2. the extent to which investment banks had similar products and had to close positions at the same time, leading to bigger market fall -knock-on effects;
3. the extent to which sellers of protection, including hedge funds, could meet their calls -any defaults would further accelerate the process;
4. the extent of redemptions demanded by structured products and hedge fund clients as risks became a public concern.
